[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [MiNT] kernel 1.15.10b fragmentation




Johan Klockars wrote:
>

> F_OS_SPECIAL does not seem to be terribly well documented (at least I didn't
> find it when grep:ing through the docs, but there was some comments in the
> sources), but from what I could see it grants others supervisor access to
> the memory space of the process that has it set. At least for an AES, that
> seems like a huge unnecessary risk (but it is of course necessary if the
> AES is also called in user context).
> 

Are you sure of this?
If this is true, I completely agree with Konrad that it should be taken out.
I intuitively assumed that it was the other way around as follows:
  The process that sets the flag gets supervisor access permissions to other
  processes memory. The flag would make the AES a privileged process.
In a GEM only setup, the AES basically replaces init.

> I don't think you can get around having an AES process of some kind in
> any case, since for example the menu should work even if no process is
> waiting for events.
> 

I carefully kept the direct call mechanism in good shape.
The ability to direct call most of the AES functions means that the code
already is pure and suitable to be put in public pages.
Or SLB's?. I assume that to be the same?

What is left then is in fact a manager for handling the client<->window database.
A window manager. :-)

XaAES is prepared for running all popups & pull downs in a window.

-- 
Groeten; Regards.
Henk Robbers.    mailto:h.robbers@chello.nl
                   http://members.ams.chello.nl/h.robbers/Home.html
A free multitasking GEM for MiNT: XaAES (heavily under construction);
Interactive disassembler: TT-Digger;  Experimental text editor: AHCX;